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ONABSTRAC7IONAND EQUIVALENCE
I. INTRODUCTION

Two recent monographs currently stand at the center of the decades-old
controversy over whether software-related inventions should be considered
patentable subject matter under § 101 of the Patent Act, a controversy still
unresolved by the Federal Circuit's recent en banc decision in In re Bilski.1
In 2005, Brookings Institution economist Ben Klemens published Math You Can't
Use: Patents,Copyrigbt,andSofiware, in which he argued that software (and generalpurpose computers programmed with software) should not be patentable.'
Klemens has subsequently clarified and elaborated this argument in a law review
article4 and founded the End Software Patents Project, an organization seeking
"to eliminate patents for software and other designs with no physically innovative
step."5
In the 2008 book Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Layers Put
Innovators atRisk,6 Boston University economics professorJames Bessen and law
professor MichaelJ. Meurer document the failure of patents to provide effective
notice of their scope.7 Bessen and Meurer single out software and business
method patents for special criticism,8 and conclude that patent reform will not
likely succeed without specifically addressing these areas. 9 They argue for
"modest" technology-specific changes in patent doctrine;" however, if these
initial changes "fail to work sufficiently well," they would consider "more
aggressive" reforms," such as restricting or eliminating the eligibility of software12
related inventions.

' In reBilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). For a brief discussion of Bilskis failure
to resolve the controversy over software patents, see infra notes 171-77 and accompanying text.
2 BEN KLEMENS, MATH You CAN'T USE: PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, AND SOFTWARE (2005).
Id. at 63-64, 158-60.
Ben Klemens, The Rise of the Information ProcessingPatent, 14 B.U.J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1 (2008).
Press Release, End Software Patents, ESP Releases Report on the State of Softpatents
(Feb.28, 2008), http://endsoftpatents.org/28-february-2008:esp-releases-report-on-the-state-of-so
ftpatents.
6 JAMES BESSEN & MICHAELJ. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOWJUDGES, BUREAUCRATS AND
LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008).
7 Id. at 46-72.
s Id. at 187-214.
9 Id.at 247.
15 See id.
at 244, 246 (proposing, inter aia, a change to the doctrine of enablement that would
treat software as "unpredictable" technology).
1 I. at 244.
12 Id. at 245.
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Both monographs provide detailed accounts of the symptoms of softwarerelated patent system dysfunction, including overwhelmed examiners,13 high
litigation costs, 4 and structural distortions of software-related industries." These
observations, particularly in the context of Bessen and Meurer's extensive review
of empirical law and economics scholarship on the patent system, lend
considerable support to the authors' policy arguments. The authors of both
books stand on shakier ground, however, in their diagnoses of the patent system's
difficulties in dealing with software-related inventions.
In a section of their book entitled "Why Software Patents Are Different,"' 6
Bessen and Meurer argue that "the abstractness of software technology inherently
makes it more difficult to place limits on abstract claims in software patents."17
Given that patent claim drafting is itself largely an exercise in abstraction,
however, it is not immediately clear why the abstract nature of software should
pose a special problem for the determination of patent scope. In fact, computer
scientists and software engineers are accustomed to thinking and communicating
precisely about levels of abstraction in software and, as I have indicated
previously 8 and will reemphasize herein, 9 this precision can be brought to bear
on the problem of defining patent scope. Bessen and Meurer attempt to illustrate
the difficulties caused by the "abstractness of software technology" with two
examples of algorithms2" whose equivalents (in some mathematical sense) may be
prohibitively difficult to recognize during the examination or term of a patent.
Part II of this Article examines these examples and demonstrates that neither of
them actually supports Bessen and Meurer's stated concern.
Klemens finds fault with the Federal Circuit's departure from longstanding
doctrine that has regarded mathematical formulas as "abstract ideas" to be
excluded from patentable subject matter.2 According to Klemens, a claim to a
programmed computer should be unpatentable whenever the program is the only
innovative element because every computer program is "nothing but a

13
14

BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 6, at 192-93; KLEMENS, supra note 2, at 84-90.
BESSEN & MEURER, supranote 6, at 191-93; KLEMENS, supra note 2, at 90-91,107; Klemens,

supra note 4, at 28-32.
Is BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 6, at 190-91; KLEMENS, supra note 2, at 92-107; Kemens,
supra note 4, at 21-27.
16 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 6, at 201-14.
17 Id. at 201.
18 See general# Andrew Chin, Computational Compkxi y and the Scope of Software Patents, 39
JURIMETRIcs J. 17 (1999) (proposing the use of computational complexity measures in patent
infringement analysis under the doctrine of equivalents).
1 See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
20 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 6, at 201-02.
2' KLEMENS, supra note 2, at 53-69; Klemens, supra note 4, at 11-21.
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mathematical equation. ' ' 2 Klemens attempts to support this characterization by
loosely paraphrasing a classical result in theoretical computer science, the ChurchTuring thesis, 23 and stating-without proof-sweeping and conclusory
propositions that supposedly follow as corollaries from Alonzo Church's and
Alan Turing's intricate mathematical theories of recursive functions. 24 The
ultimate effect, if not the purpose, of Klemens's appeal to deep theory is to dazzle
the "non-geeks"25 rather than to prove any point. Part III of this Article shows
that the Church-Turing thesis actually applies to relatively few software-related
inventions and does not speak to Klemens's proposed doctrinal reforms.
In summary, Bessen and Meurer argue, through their examples, that software
inventions are inherently too abstract to describe their scope reliably in a patent
claim, and in this respect are different enough from other inventions to require
technology-specific treatment in patent doctrine. Kiemens argues, through
theory, that software inventions should be deemed so abstract as to be
unpatentable as a matter of law. Parts II and III of this Article show that both of
these categorical arguments were presented without adequate factual support.
These critiques imply that the authors' proposals for software technology-specific
patent law reform are subject to empirical examination and critique as policy
choices and are therefore unlikely to be achieved through judicially developed
categorical distinctions. They also highlight the need for precise language in the
ongoing debate over patent reform, in which the meanings of legal, scientific and
economic concepts are accurately informed by the understandings of their
respective disciplines, rather than intuitions and analogies. Part IV of this Article
concludes with additional comments and directions for further work.

ii. BESSEN AND MEURER
Without singling out any particular area of technology, courts and scholars
have long described the ambiguity of claim language as a pervasive impediment
to the notice function of patents.2 6 Even Bessen and Meurer acknowledge that

22 KLEMENS, supranote 2, at 64-65.

' See id. at 26 (introducing the Church-Turing thesis); Klemens, supra note 4, at 9-10
(proceeding to discuss the implications of the thesis without stating the thesis itself).
24 See infra Part III.c.
2 KLEMENS, supra note 2, at 24.
' See, e.g., Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391,396-97 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (describing
claim drafting as a "conversion of machine to words [that] allows for unintended idea gaps which
cannot be satisfactorily filled'); Gretchen Ann Bender, Uncertainty and Unpredictabiy in Patent
Ltigation: The Time is Ripefora ConsistentClaim ConstructionMethodology, 8J. INTELL. PROP. L. 175, 209
(2001) (arguing that "claim language is often inherently ambiguous'); Michael Risch, The Failureof
Pubic Notice in Patent Prosecution, 21 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 179, 192 (2007) (citing thirty percent
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"the problems of abstract patent claims clearly apply to a broad range of
technologies in addition to software." 2 Nevertheless, they argue that software
patents differ in that the abstractness of software technology inherently makes it
more difficult to limit abstract claims in software patents.28 Specifically, Bessen
and Meurer are concerned that computer algorithms have "disparate
representations" that may be impossible for even computer scientists to recognize
at the time a patent issues, thereby "crea[ting] critically difficult problems for the
notice function of the patent system."29
To illustrate this difficulty, Bessen and Meurer first discuss an "equivalence"
between two examples of a large class of apparently intractable computational
problems known as NP-complete problems. ° Stated informally, the travelingsalesmanproblem is to find the shortest tour that visits each of a list of cities (in any
order), given the known distances between each pair of cities.3 The map-coloring
problem is to paint the regions of a given map with a minimal number of colors so
that no two adjacent regions are the same color.32 Bessen and Meurer write:
IT]he 'traveling-salesman' problem, which is used for routing
delivery trucks among other things, is more or less equivalent to the
'map-coloring' problem and a whole range of other problems. This
means that an algorithm for solving the traveling-salesman problem
is also, if worded broadly enough, an algorithm for doing map
coloring.33

appellate reversal rate of district court claim construction rulings); see also United Carbon Co. v.
Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942) ("A zone of uncertainty which enterprise and
experimentation may enter only at the risk of infringement claims would discourage invention only
a little less than unequivocal foreclosure of the field."); Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 573-74
(1876) ("The public should not be deprived of rights supposed to belong to it, without being clearly
told what it is that limits these rights. The genius of the inventor, constantly making improvements
in existing patents-a process which gives to the patent system its greatest value-should not be
restrained by vague and indefinite descriptions of claims in existing patents from the salutary and
necessary right of improving on that which has already been invented.').
27 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 6, at 201.
2 id.
29 Id. at 201-02.

3 Id. For an explanation of NP-complete, see infra Part II.A.2.
31 MIcHAEL R. GAREY & DAVID S.JOHNSON, COMPUTERS AND INTRACTABILITY: A GUIDE
TO THE THEORY OF NP-COMPLETENESS 18-20 (1979).
32 KENNETH APPEL & WOLFGANG HAKEN, EVERY PLANAR GRAPH Is FOUR-COLORABLE 1-4

(1989).

33 BESSEN & MEURER,

supra note 6, at 201-02.
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The authors' concern here is that a patent claim directed specifically to an
algorithm for solving one NP-complete problem might eventually be construed
more abstractly as covering the "whole range" of algorithms for solving NPcomplete problems.34
Bessen and Meurer's second illustration concerns a patented linear
programming algorithm whose "equivalence" to prior art methods was only
discovered by other computer scientists in 1986, two years after the algorithm was
published:
This patent is sometimes cited as an example of what a software
patent should be: a highly specific, nontrivial contribution to
practical knowledge. Yet serious questions exist as to the
boundaries of even this patent, questions as to whether its claims
are truly novel, and whether [the inventor Narendra] Karmarkar
actually "possessed" all the technologies claimed. One problem is
that Karmarkar's algorithm seemed similar to technologies
developed during the 1960s.
In 1986, computer scientists
demonstrated, in fact, that Karmarkar's algorithm is equivalent to
a class of techniques that was known and applied to linear problems
during the 1960s.
Moreover, after this equivalence was
demonstrated, computer scientists began applying algorithms based
on these older techniques to linear programming problems-some
of these algorithms appeared to work better than the KarmarkarAT&T approach ....
Given these facts, consider the difficulty of determining the
boundaries of this patent. Would anyone have seen Karmarkar's
algorithm as novel in light of the techniques used in the 1960s?
Certainly not after 1986, when their equivalence was proved. But
even in 1984, computer scientists might well have had doubts, yet
they would have been unable to make a certain comparison ....
Similarly, would AT&T have been able to assert its patent
successfully against people who used linear-programming
techniques based on those used in the 1960s? Apparently, AT&T
was able to obtain a cross-license from IBM, which had used these
older techniques.
The abstractness of the patented algorithm means that these
3
determinations cannot be made with certainty.

'4

31

Id. at 201.
Id. at 202-03 (citations omitted).
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Here, the authors' concern is essentially that Karmarkar's claims, being directed
to an algorithm, were necessarily drafted in terms that were so abstract that they
obscured the relevance of certain prior art techniques to the patentability analysis,
thereby resulting in the patenting of an invention of dubious novelty.
The basic problem with Bessen and Meurer's illustrations is that in each case
the computational concept of equivalence does not correspond to the relevant
legal standard of equivalence pertaining to a claimed invention. As the following
technical discussion should make clear, it is highly implausible that an algorithm
for solving any particular NP-complete problem would be patented under a claim
that was only later understood to cover solutions to the general class of NPcomplete problems, either literally or by equivalents. It should also become
apparent that the aforementioned mathematical programming techniques from
the 1960s would not have sufficed as prior art to show that Karmarkar's
algorithm was anticipated or obvious in 1984.
A. "EQUIVALENCES" AMONG ALGORITHMS FOR NP-COMPLETE PROBLEMS

The mathematical theory of computational complexity has historically supplied
computer science with the rigor necessary to study computational problems and
algorithms. One of the most important milestones in this field came in 1971 with
the publication by Stephen Cook of a set of results concerning the apparent
intractability of a large class of computational problems.36 From Cook's theory
emerged the understanding that many well-known problems, such as the traveling
salesman and map coloring problems, are nearly enough equivalent that each is
equally resistant to solution by an efficient (i.e., polynomial time) algorithm.3 7 To
formalize this notion of equivalence, it is necessary to understand three important
concepts from computational complexity theory: poynomial-time algorithms, NPcompleteness, and poynomial-time reductions.
1. Polynomial-Time Algorithms. The standard basis for measuring the
computational complexity of an algorithm is the Turing machine, an abstract
model of computation.38 A Turing machine consists of a read-write head, an infinite
tape consisting of spaces for symbols that can be read or written, and a finite state
control that can move the head one space to the left or right along the tape
depending on the machine's state.39 A program for a Turing machine essentially
consists of a transition function that determines the machine's next step (writing,

Stephen A. Cook, The Compkxity ofTheorem-ProngPrcedures,in PROC. OF THE 3RDANN.ACM
SYMP. ON THEORY OF COMPUTING 151 (1971).
37 GAREY &JOHNSON, supra note 31, at 1-14.

SId at 23.
39aid
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moving and changing state) depending on the machine's current state and the
symbol currently being read.' The program also specifies two final states, "yes"
and "no," for which the machine's next step is simply to halt the computation.4 1
For a given program, whether the Turing machine eventually halts in a "yes" state
or a "no" state depends on the initial content of the tape, when read relative to
the initial position of the head.42 (A relatively simple example of a Turing
machine program is provided in the Appendix.)
A Turing machine is a relatively weak computational model, but powerful
enough to support a stable classification of problems as tractable or intractable.43
For such a complexity analysis to proceed, the problem in question must be
restated as a dedsionproblemthat can be answered with a "yes" or "no," and there
must be a system for encoding any instance of the problem as a string of symbols
that can be read from a Turing machine tape.' A decision problem II is said to
be tractable if there exists a poynomial-ime algorithm for solving it (i.e., there is a
polynomialp such that there exists a Turing machine program that halts with the
correct decision for each instance of II in no more thanp(n) steps, where n is the
size of, for example, the number of symbols in the encoded instance).4" The class
of tractable problems is referred to simply as P. II is said to be intractableif there
exists no polynomial-time algorithm for solving it.'
The class P of tractable problems, as defined here, turns out to be the same
regardless of the underlying computational model,47 and corresponds to a longstanding consensus among computer scientists about the feasibility of solving
increasingly large-scale problems on increasingly powerful real-world machines.48
This consensus dates back to the 1960s, when papers by computer scientists Alan
Cobham and Jack Edmonds famously highlighted the fundamental importance
of the distinction between polynomial-time ("good") algorithms and less efficient
("bad") algorithms.49 Their basic point was that as the processing speed of
available computers increases exponentially over time-an empirical observation

40 id.

41 Id. at

23-24.

42 id

41 Id. at

7-8.

44 Id. at
41 Id. at

9-11.
26-27.

46 Id.

41 See id at 10 ("All the realistic models of computers studied so far... are equivalent with
respect to polynomial time complexity....').
48 Id. at 6-11.

4 Alan Cobham, The Intinnsic ComputationalDifficul of Functions, in PROC. OF THE 1964 INT'L
CONGRESS FOR LOGIC METHODOLOGY AND PHIL. OF Sci. 24 (Y. Bar-Hille ed., 1964); Jack
Edmonds, Paths, Trees, andFlowers, 17 CAN. J. MATH. 449 (1965).
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popularly known as Moore's Law 5 -it is polynomial-time algorithms, and only
polynomial-time algorithms, that are capable of harnessing these improvements
to solve exponentially larger problem instances."' For example, following a 100factor speedup in processing speed, an algorithm that takes n2 steps to solve
instances of size n will be able to handle instances ten times as large as before the
increase in processing speed, but an algorithm that takes 2" steps will only be able
to handle instances that are incrementally (i.e., an additional 6.64 input symbols)
52

larger.

2. NP-Completeness. It is relatively straightforward to prove the complexity and
correctness of an efficient algorithm for solving a problem and thereby to show
that the problem is tractable (i.e., in P). As is often the case, however, proving the
negative is considerably more difficult. The most that can be said about the
computational difficulty of solving many problems is that a polynomial-time
algorithm is very unlikely to exist.
Even without formal proofs of intractability, computer scientists have
managed to show that some computational problems are relatively difficult. They
have focused these efforts on the class NP, which consists of those problems for
which a polynomial-time algorithm might conceivably exist (whether or not one
has already been discovered)., 3 The hardest problems in NP, including such
familiar examples as the traveling-salesman and graph-coloring problems, are
known as NP-complete problems.
As illustrated in Figure 1, the class of NP-complete problems has the special
property that if any NP-complete problem is tractable, then all problems in NP
are tractable (i.e., P=NP). Thus a proof that a problem is NP-complete serves to
demonstrate that the problem is intractable, provided that P*NP. NP-complete
problems are sometimes referred to as "equivalent" because of this common
property; it is in this sense that Bessen and Meurer's use of the term is apt."4

so See Gordon E. Moore, Cramming More Components onto Integrated Circuits, ELECTRONICS,
Apr. 19,1965, availableathttp://download.intel.com/research/silicon/moorespaper.pdf(1965 paper
by Intel co-founder announcing the theory).
s' See GAREY & JOHNSON, supra note 31, at 7-8 (assessing the effect of improvements in
computer technology on "the largest problem instance solvable in one hour" using algorithms with

various complexities).
52 See id. at 6-11 (describing polynomial time algorithms and intractable problems).
5' In the Turing machine model, the behavior of such a hypothetical polynomial-time algorithm
is formally equivalent to a nondeterministic algorithm in which a "guessed structure" of polynomial
size may be appended to the input to aid the computation, thereby reducing the problem to one of
verification. GAREY &JOHNSON, supra note 31, at 27-32.
s See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
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NPNP
-

P*NP

P= NP=
NP-Complete

I

P=NP

Figure 1. Relationships among the complexity classes P, NP and NP-complete in two
alternative states of the world.
It is unknown whether P=NP or P NP; in fact, this has become one of the
most important open questions in mathematics and computer science.55 Until it
is established that P 9NP, the traveling salesman and map-coloring problems and
thousands of other NP-complete problems will lack an efficient solution, yet will
not be known to be intractable. Failure to establish that P=NP, on the other
hand, signifies the failure of the entire scientific community to find a polynomialtime algorithm for solving any one of the thousands of NP-complete problems.
Even though computer scientists are certainly well aware that "[a]bsence of
evidence is not evidence of absence,"56 many have viewed the absence of an
efficient solution to any NP-complete problem as evidence that none can exist
(i.e., that P#NP).57 Garey and Johnson whimsically expressed this view in their
classic 1979 treatise on NP-completeness.58 They imagined that if tasked with
designing an efficient algorithm for some new computational problem, say, the
"bandersnatch problem":

51 See, e.g., Michael Sipser, The History andStatus of the P versus NPQuesion,in PROC. OFTHE 24TH
ANN. ACM SYMP. ON THEORY OF COMPUTING 603 (1992) (describing it as "one of the most
important problems in contemporary mathematics and theoretical computer science"); Clay
Mathematics Institute, P vs. NP Problem, http://www.claymath.org/millennium/P vs NP (last
visited Jan. 23, 2009) (describing it as one of seven "Millennium Problems" for which the Institute
offered a standing prize of $1 million in 2000).
56 See, e.g., Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387,1470-71 (D. Or. 1996) (describing
this maxim as "one of the major tenets of science').
" See, e.g., William A. Gasarch, Guest Column: The P=?NPPoll, 33 SIGACT NEws 34 (2002),
availabkat http://www.cs.umd.edu/-gasarch/papers/poll.pdf (polling leading computer scientists
on when and how the P = ?NP problem will be solved).
" GAREY &JOHNSON, spra note 31.
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You might be able to prove that the bandersnatch problem is NPcomplete and, hence, that it is equivalent to all these other hard
problems. Then you could march into your boss's office and
announce: "I can't find an efficient algorithm, but neither can all
these famous people." At the very least, this would inform your
boss that it would do no good to fire you and hire another expert
on algorithms.5 9
Three decades later, both the list of "famous people" and the universe of
unconquered NP-complete problems have grown dramatically, further bolstering
the case that P#NP.
In the computer science research community, the view that the edifice of NPcompleteness has grown too formidable to collapse is dominant but not universal.
In a recent survey of prominent computer scientists, a substantial majority (61%)
predicted an eventual proof that P NP, while only a small minority (9%)
predicted that it will turn out that P=NP. ° Few (30%) expected the question to
be resolved by the year 2029.61
The P versus NP problem appears from the survey to have humbled many of
the most accomplished computer scientists of our time. Turing Award winner
Richard Karp responded, "My intuitive belief is that P is unequal to NP, but the
only supporting arguments I can offer are the failure of al efforts to place specific
62
NP-complete problems in P by constructing polynomial-time algorithms.
While taking a contrary view, Senior Whitehead Prize winner Bela Bollobas was
equally tentative, describing himself as "on the loony fringe of the mathematical
community" in believing "not too strongly" that P=NP would be proved within
twenty years.63 Jim Owings, an emeritus professor at the University of Maryland,
was more philosophical about the state of his knowledge: "It is the greatest
unsolved problem in mathematics ....It is the raison d'etre of abstract computer
64
science, and as long as it remains unsolved, its mystery will ennoble the field.",
Even respondents who expected an eventual proof that P=NP expressed
doubt that such a result would enable the solution of all NP-complete problems
inpractice. Donald Knuth, the founder of the modern science of algorithms,

s Id.
at 1-3.

6 Gasarch, supra note 57, at 36.
61 Id. But see id at 38 (noting John Conway's opinion that "this shouldn't really be a hard
problem; it's just that we came late to this theory, and haven't yet developed any techniques for
proving computations to be hard").
62

Id at 41.

63 Id at 37.
64Id. at 43.
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wrote that he expects P=NP to be the consequence of an indirect proof, so that
"we will never know" the complexity of an NP-complete problem.65 Other
respondents expected any proof of P=NP to result in polynomial time bounds
for NP-complete problems whose degrees, coefficients,66or both were too high to
assure the existence of a practical algorithmic solution.
3. Polynomial-Time Reducions. The distinction between problems known and
not known to have polynomial-time algorithms has special significance because
of Moore's Law and the theory of NP-completeness. 67 Since polynomials with
high degrees or coefficients can grow very quickly, however, a problem may be
in P yet lack a practical algorithmic solution even for small inputs. Computational
complexity theory must therefore also be concerned with achieving the lowest
possible upper bounds on the time required to solve tractable problems. An
eventual proof that P=NP would imply that all NP-complete problems could be
solved by polynomial-time algorithms, but it would not immediately imply the
existence of practical algorithms for solving all NP-complete problems. Instead,
it would instigate a further program of research into the complexity of individual
NP-complete problems.68
Much work on the complexity of specific NP-complete problems has already
been done. The typical procedure for proving a decision problem H1 E NP to be
NP-complete is to show that II is at least as unlikely to be in P as some other
problem [It0 that has previously been shown to be NP-complete. This procedure
involves constructing what is known as a polynomial-time reduction from 10 to
[1, i.e., a polynomial-time computable function f that maps each possible instance
x of IL0 into a corresponding instance f(x) of [1 that yields the same yes-or-no
decision.69 The idea is that any polynomial-time algorithm that solves - could be
used as a polynomial-time solution for 1-0: given an input x to problem I[o,
simply calculate the transformed value f(x) in polynomial time, and then solve H
7°
in polynomial time.
Stephen Cook's article laid the groundwork for this research by identifying and
proving the first problem to be NP-complete from first principles.7 The
problem, now known in the literature as SATISFLABILITY (or SAT for short),
is to determine whether a Boolean formula on n true-or-false variables, given in

61

Id at 41.
See id. (noting comments of Vladik Kreinovich and Clyde Kruskal).

67 See supranotes 47-52 and accompanying text.

6 See, e.g., infra notes 96-97 (discussing Karmarkar's improvement of Khachiyan's upper bound
for the complexity of linear programming).
69 GAREY &JOHNSON, supra note 31, at 34.
70 Id at 34-35.
71 Cook, supra note 36.
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disjunctive normal form (i.e., an AND of OR-clauses on the nvariables and their
negations), can be made true by some assignment of values to the variables.72
Cook's result 73 essentially constructed a polynomial-time reduction from any
problem in NP to SAT.74 Cook's article then went on to show, inter alia, a
polynomial-time reduction from SAT to a second NP-complete problem, now
referred to as SUBGRAPH ISOMORPHISM. 71 Soon thereafter, Richard Karp
published an article presenting proofs of the NP-completeness of twenty-one
well-known problems in computer science, including 3SAT, a variant of SAT in
which each OR-clause consists of exactly three terms.76
Over the years, thousands of problems have been added to a growing tree of
NP-complete problems, each linked to a previous member of the class by a
polynomial-time reduction.7 7 Between any two NP-complete problems on the
tree, it is possible to trace a chain of polynomial-time reductions that
demonstrates their equivalence, in the sense that both problems are equally
unlikely to be tractable. 78 If used in practice, however, polynomial-time
reductions can generate significant overheads, both in the time required to
calculate the transformed inputs and in the size of the transformed inputs
themselves. Where several polynomial-time reductions are applied in succession,
these overheads will be compounded.
To illustrate the overheads that may result from a polynomial-time reduction,
consider another of Karp's problems, known as VERTEX COVER. The
problem may be stated as follows: given a graph of N vertices and M edges and
an integer n < N, is there some subset of n vertices that includes at least one
endpoint of every edge in the graph? 9 Garey and Johnson present a proof that
VERTEX COVER is NP-complete by presenting a polynomial-time reduction
f from 3SAT to VERTEX COVER. Figure 2 illustrates how the reduction f

72

See GAREY &JOHNSON, supra note 31, at 39 (defining SAT).

73 See Cook, supra note 36, at 152-53 (proving Theorem 1).
74 See GAREY&JOHNSON, supranote 31, at 44 (restating Cook's result as showing the existence

of a polynomial-time reduction fL from a nondeterministic Turing machine computation

recognizing the language L to SAT).

71 Cook, supranote 36, at 153-54 (provingTheorem 2); GAREY &JOHNSON, supranote 31, at 47.
76 Richard M. Karp, RedudbiU'iAmong CombinatoialProblems,in COMPLEXITY OF COMPUTER

COMPUTATIONS 85 (RE. Miller & J.W. Thatcher eds., 1972).
" For early versions of this tree see GAREY & JOHNSON, supra note 31, at 47; Karp, supra
note 76, at 96.
Ts See supra notes 31, 54 and accompanying text.
9 See Karp, stipra note 76, at 94 (referring to the problem as NODE COVER); GAREY &
JOHNSON, supra note 31, at 46.
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operates to convert the 3SAT instance (U1 V -U
instance of VERTEX COVER with n = 8.80
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Figure 2. VERTEX COVER instance resulting from the 3SAT instance (u v -u, v
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For each variable that appears in the 3SAT instance, the VERTEX COVER
instance has two vertices representing the variable and its negation and connected
by an edge. Each clause in the 3SAT instance is represented by three vertices
c[z],c 2[],c3[i], connected by three edges to form a triangle. Finally, each of the
three vertices representing each clause is connected to the vertex that represents
82
the corresponding variable (or its negation) as it appears in the 3SAT instance.
While this polynomial-time reduction from 3SAT to VERTEX COVER is
simple and even elegant, it requires some computational time and some expansion
in the instance size. A person possessing an efficient algorithm for VERTEX
COVER might well wonder if there was a faster way of solving 3SAT directly,
instead of first converting each instance of 3SAT to an instance of VERTEX
COVER in order to be solved. This concern about the overhead of polynomialtime reductions becomes even more warranted when more distant problems on
the tree of NP-complete problems are considered.
4. Bessen and Meurer's 'Equivalence." According to Bessen and Meurer, a
software developer trying to solve the map-coloring problem might inadvertently
infringe a patent claim directed to a traveling-salesman algorithm (or vice versa)
because of the equivalence between the two problems. This possibility, the
authors contend, is illustrative of an inherent and unique deficiency in the notice
function of software patent claims-at least those that are "worded broadly

o The required size of the vertex cover (n = 8) is determined by adding the number of variables
(four) to twice the number of clauses (two) in the given 3SAT instance. GAREY &JOHNSON, supra
note 31, at 55.
81 Id.
2

Id. at 54-56.
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enough."83 Given the context provided above, however, it is difficult to imagine
that such a problematic ambiguity in the scope of a software patent claim would
ever arise.
In understanding the effect that the equivalence among NP-complete
problems might have on software patent scope, it is important to distinguish
between problems and algorithms. A chain of polynomial-time reductions that
demonstrates the equivalence between two NP-complete problems does not show
that all algorithms for solving those problems are equivalent. It shows only that
given a hypothetical algorithm for solving one problem, it is possible to derive a
particular algorithm for solving the other. Moreover, the derived algorithm
provides only an indirect solution that may be inefficient and even impractical.
As shown in Figure 3, the chains of polynomial-time reductions from MAP
COLORING to TRAVELING SALESMAN and vice versa both involve several
links.
MAP COLORING o SATISFIABILITY - 3SAT
VERTEX COVER - HAMILTONIAN CIRCUIT
TRAVELING SALESMAN
TRAVELING SALESMAN - SATISFIABILITY - 3SAT
MAP COLORING
Figure 3. Chains of polynomial-time reductions proven between MAP COLORING
AND TRAVELING SALESMAN."
For Bessen and Meurer's scenario to take place, it would require more than the
fact that a claim directed to a polynomial-time traveling-salesman algorithm was
"worded broadly enough." 5 It would require that an independently discovered
algorithm for the map-coloring problem correctly implemented each of the
detailed and intricate polynomial-time reductions in the chain, as well as each of
the steps recited in the claim to the traveling salesman algorithm. A more broadly
worded claim to a traveling salesman algorithm might cover the use of the recited
computational steps across a wider range of fields, but it cannot widen the range
of conditions under which a polynomial-time reduction is logically correct. (From

83

See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text; see also BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 6,

at 201-02 (noting that a broadly worded algorithm for solving the traveling-salesman problem must
also serve as an algorithm for doing map coloring).
84 Seegeneral#GAREY&JOHNSON, supranote 31, at 190-288 (cataloguing reductions among NPcomplete problems).
" See supranote 83 and accompanying text.
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the description above of one such reduction, from VERTEX COVER to 3SAT,86
it should be clear that these conditions are mathematically well-defined and
precise.) It seems most unlikely that an independent scientist, seeking a direct and
efficient solution to the map-coloring problem, would in passing replicate the
details (and assume the overhead) of the entire chain of reductions to the traveling
salesman problem.
It is also worth noting here that the equivalence among NP-complete
problems due to polynomial-time reductions does not imply equivalence between
specific algorithms for solving those problems under patent law's doctrine of
equivalents. Under the doctrine of equivalents, a device that does not fall within
the literal scope of a claim may nevertheless be found to infringe "if it performs
substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same
result."87 This "triple identity" determination is to be applied to a claim "as an
objective inquiry on an element-by-element basis."8 A chain of polynomial-time
reductions, however, does not translate an algorithm for solving one problem into
an algorithm for solving another on a step-by-step or element-by-element basis.
Rather, it converts an instance of one problem into an instance of the other. By
the time the steps of the original algorithm are to be performed on the converted
instance, all of the polynomial-time reductions have already been completed, and
can play no part in a step-by-step analysis of equivalence to the original
algorithm.89 Thus, in Bessen and Meurer's scenario, a correct implementation of
the entire chain of polynomial-time reductions by the accused algorithm would
be a prerequisite not only for a finding of literal infringement, but for a finding
of infringement by equivalents as well. As discussed above, it is highly unlikely
that an independently designed algorithm would happen to follow this approach.
Finally, it should be remembered that the notion of equivalence via
polynomial-time reductions between a newly discovered map-coloring algorithm
and a previously claimed traveling-salesman algorithm (or vice versa) presupposes
a state of the world in which polynomial-time algorithms for NP-complete
problems are known to exist (i.e., that P=NP). As we have seen, few computer
scientists believe this to be the case.90 Moreover, it is almost unimaginable that
anyone who discovered a polynomial-time traveling salesman algorithm, thereby
proving that P=NP, would simply patent the algorithm and fail to announce the
broader result. In sum, software developers have very little to fear from

' See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
g' Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605,608 (1950) (quoting Sanitary
Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929)).
s Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997).
s See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
o See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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inadequately noticed patents on polynomial-time algorithms for NP-complete
problems.
B. LINEAR PROGRAMMING AND KARMARKAR'S ALGORITHM

1. Karmarkar's Contributions. Bessen and Meurer's second illustration of the
problematic "abstractness of software technology" concerns Narendra
Karmarkar's celebrated (and patented) algorithm for linearprogramming,9' which
solves a form of constrained optimization problem commonly used in operations
research and public policy analysis. The linear programming problem is to
maximize (or, alternatively, to minimize) the value of a given linear function in
real variables (the objectivefunction), where the variables are subject to a system of
linear inequalities (the constraints).92 The more general problem in which the
objective function and constraints may be nonlinear is referred to as mathematical
programming, a mathematical programming problem that is not a linear
93
programming problem is known as a nonlinearprogrammingproblem.
When Cook and Karp published their first results on the theory of NPcompleteness in the early 1970s, 9' linear programming had already been long
recognized as an important computational problem, 9 but no one knew then
whether or not it could be solved in polynomial time. It was not until 1979 that
Leonid Khachiyan showed linear programming to be tractable by presenting an
algorithm that required at most O(n 6 L) time to solve a problem with n variables
and L input bits.96
Karmarkar announced his algorithm in May 1984 at the Association for
Computing Machinery's annual symposium on theoretical computer science 9 and
submitted a revised and extended exposition of the algorithm for publication later
that year. 98 While his results came too late to be credited with resolving the
91 U.S. Patent No. 4,744,028 (filed Apr. 19, 1985).
92

ANTHONYV. FIAcco &GARTHP. McCoRMICK, NONLINEAR PROGRAMMING: SEQUENTIAL

UNCONSTRAINED MINIMIZATION TECHNIQUES 1-2 (1968).
93 Id.
94 See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
95 See general# VERA RILEY & SAUL I. GASS, LINEAR PROGRAMMING AND ASSOCIATED
TECHNIQUES: A COMPREHENSIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY ON LINEAR, NONLINEAR, AND DYNAMIC
PROGRAMMING 13-42 (1958) (reviewing research as of 1958).
96 See Leonid G. Khachiyan, A Polynomial Algorithm in Linear Programmin, 244 DOKLADY
AKADEM11A NAUK. SSSR 1093 (1979), translatedin 20 SOvIET MATH. DOKLADY 191 (1979). The
parameter L accounts for the complexity of real-number calculations that may require an arbitrary
degree of precision. Id.
97 See Narendra Karmarkar, A New Ponomial-TimeAlgorithm for LinearProgramming, PROC. OF
THE 16TH ACM SYMP. ON THEORY OF COMPUTING 302 (1984).
" See Narendra Karmarkar, A New PoLynomial-Time Algonithm for Linear Programming, 4
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question of linear programming's tractability, they were groundbreaking in other
ways. Previous linear programming algorithms, including Khachiyan's, searched
for possible solutions (known as "iterates ' ) by moving from corner to corner
around the boundary of the n-dimensional region (known as a "polytope')
defined by the constraints of the problem. Karmarkar's insight was that interior
points provide richer information than boundary points on which direction will
lead to the greatest improvement in the objective function. A prior art "exteriorpoint" method and Karmarkar's "interior-point" method are contrasted in
Figure 4.

Figure 4. Comparison
between George
Dantzig's simplex
(left) and Karmarkar's
exterior-point algorithm
interior-point algorithm
(right) for linear
programming. 99

Karmarkar filed
a United States
Id
patent application
"Methods
and Apparatus for
on April 19, 1985
Efficient
titled
Resource Allocation.'
on May 10, 1988
and was assigned
The
patent
issued
to
his employer, AT&T
At each iteration,
2
Karmarkar's algorithm
Bell Laboratories 10
performs a projective
transformation on
U.S.
9 Patent No. 4,744,028
figs.l, 3 (filed Apr.
proceeds entirely
19, 1985). In the
on the boundary
simplex method,
of the
(point 21). Id
the search
at col. 2. In Karmarkar's polytope from the initial iterate
(point 12) to the solution
polytope from the
method, the search
initial iterate (point
proceeds within
51) until a solution
the interior of the
is reached that satisfies
the condition for
termination (point
53). Id at coL 4.
101

Id
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the polytope so that the previous iterate, a boundary point, is mapped into the
interior of the transformed polytope. °2 From that interior point, the algorithm
finds the next iterate by moving along a line in the direction that maximizes the
objective function until it reaches the boundary. 10 3 By following this more
efficient approach, Karmarkar's algorithm achieves a worst-case running time of
O(nW L), a vast improvement over Khachiyan's algorithm for practical
purposes.' °4 Karmarkar's algorithm also has the virtue of being relatively easy to
05
implement.
2. Doubts as to Karmarkar'sContributions. According to Bessen and Meurer, the
validity of Karmarkar's patent is called into doubt by both prior and subsequent
developments. They correctly note that the use of interior-point methods to
solve linear programming problems was not new in 1984, but (as Philip Gill et al.
documented in 1986) had a long and distinguished history dating back to
the 1940s and 1950s, including efforts by John von Neumann, Alan Hoffman,
Charles Tompkins, and Ragnar Frisch. 0 6 In practice, these earlier interior-point
methods were not competitive with George Dantzig's simplex algorithm, an
exterior-point method that was known to have worst-case exponential running
time, 107 but was considered acceptable for reasonably small problems because of
its conceptual simplicity.' 8 (They also did not succeed in developing a
polynomial-time algorithm for linear programming; that achievement would be
left to Khachiyan in 1979.)19 Accordingly, researchers found it more fruitful to
investigate the application of interior-point methods to nonlinear programming.
By 1968, when operations researchers Anthony Fiacco and Garth McCormick

102 See Michael J. Todd, The Many Facets of Linear Programming 91

MATHEMATICAL

PROGRAMMING SERIES 417, 426-27 (2002) (providing background for interior point methods).
103 Id. at 427.
104 Karmarkar, supra note 97, at 302.
105See, e.g., E.R. Swart, How I mpemented the KarmarkarAlgorthmin One Evening, 15 APL QUOTE
QUAD 13 (1985) (providing source code of a ninety-two-line program implementing the Karmarkar
algorithm in Array Processing Language).
106 See Philip E. Gill et al., On Projected Newton Bamier Methods for Linear Programming and an
Equivalence to Karmarkar'sProjetive Method, 36 MATH. PROGRAMMING 183, 184 (1986) (citations
omitted).
107 See Victor Klee & George J. Minty, Jr., How Good is the Simplex Method?, in INEQUALITIES
III 159 (Ored Sisha ed., 1972).
108 The simplex algorithm is still the only computational linear-programming method presented
in introductory operations research textbooks. See, e.g., DAvID R_ ANDERSON ET AL., AN
INTRODUCTION TO MANAGEMENT SCIENCE: A QUANTITATIVE APPROACH TO DECISION MAKING
chs. 5-6 (2007). It remains "the method of choice" for many applications. Roy Marsten et al.,
InteriorPointMethodsfor linear Programming: just CallNewton, Lagrange, and Fiacoand McCormick., 20
INTERFACES 105, 115 (1990).
109 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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published their treatise on nonlinear programming, their presentation of interiorpoint methods and related results constituted one full chapter and parts of four
others."
In the years following the publication of Karmarkar's algorithm, some
researchers began to identify connections between the earlier work focused on
nonlinear programming and Karmarkar's more recent work on linear
programming."' In their 1986 paper, Gill et al. note that Frisch's interior-point
methods allow for a choice of the direction the search algorithm is to take from
one iterate to the next." 2 One possible way of determining this direction is to
minimize a quadratic approximation to a "barrier function" F(x), defined by
n

F(x) = cX -

lnxi
j=1

that incorporates both the problem's objective function and its constraints." 3 Gill
et al. refer to this direction as the "Newton search direction" in honor of Sir Isaac
Newton, who is credited with discovering this numerical approach to
approximating the minima of differentiable functions." 4 Their main result is that
for a particular value of the parameter/u, the Newton search direction is the same
as the direction prescribed by Karmarkar's algorithm." 5 Gill et al. are careful to
characterize their finding as "an existence result, showing that a special case of the
[Newton] barrier method would follow the same path as the [Karmarkar]
projective method.""' 6 In the article's introduction, however, they describe this
result more broadly as "a formal equivalence between the Newton search
direction and the direction associated with Karmarkar's algorithm.""' 7 The title

110FIACco & McCORMIcK, supra note 92, at chs. 3, 5-8.
I11

See Marsten et al., supra note 108, at 105-06 (noting that shortly after 1984, "[m]any others

worked on bringing Karmarkar's method, which at first appeared to be coming completely out of

left field, into our classical framework for optimization').
It is worth noting that Karmarkar himself did not acknowledge any such connections in his

patent application or either of his 1984 publications. None of Karmarkar's lists of references cite
any of the literature on nonlinear programming. See U.S. Patent No. 4,744,028 (filed Apr. 19,1985);
Karmarkar, supra note 97, at 311; Karmarkar, spra note 98, at 395.
112 See Gill et al., supranote 106 (referencing K. Ragnar Fisch, The Logarithmic Potential Method
of Convex Programming (1955) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of Economics,
Oslo, Norway)).
113 Id.at 185-86.
114 Id

at
11 Id at
116 Id. at
117 Id.at

186.
190-91.
191.
184 (citation omitted).
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of their article is broader still, suggesting equivalence not merely between the
search directions employed by the respective methods, but between the methods
themselves: "On Projected Newton Barrier Methods for Linear Programming
and an Equivalence to Karmarkar's Projective Method."".8
A 1990 article by Roy Marsten et al. also describes Gill et al.'s existence result
in broad terms as "an equivalence between Karmarkar's method and projected
Newton barrier methods."" 9 In an elegant exposition, Marsten et al. outline the
respective contributions of Fiacco and McCormick, Newton, and the eighteenthcentury Italian mathematician Joseph-Louis Lagrange to the "special case of the
[Newton] barrier method" identified by Gill et al.' 20 They do this not only to
present Gill et al.'s results to a wider audience in the operations research and
management science community, but to respond to what they saw as hubris on
the part of Karmarkar and AT&T:
In 1984, Narendra Karmarkar began the "new era of
mathematical programming" with the publication of his landmark
paper. Shortly thereafter his employer, AT&T, invited the
professional mathematical programming community to roll over
and die. Speaking as representatives of this community, we took
21
this as rather a challenge.'
Accordingly, Marsten et al.'s title and abstract suggest an account of the "new era"
in which Karmarkar's contributions may be rightly omitted as redundant:
InteriorPoint Methodsfor LinearProgramming:
Just CallNewton, Lagrange, and Fiaco and McCormick!
Interior point methods are the right way to solve large linear
programs. They are also much easier to derive, motivate, and
understand than they at first appeared. Lagrange told us how to
convert a minimization with equality constraints into an
unconstrained minimization. Fiacco and McCormick told us how
to convert a minimization with inequality constraints into a
sequence of unconstrained minimizations. Newton told us how to

118 Id.at 183.
119

Marsten et al., supra note 108, at 106.

120

Id. at 106-08.
Id. at 105 (quotation unattnibuted in original).

121
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solve unconstrained minimizations.
Linear programs
minimizations with equations and inequalities. Voila!"z

are

Marsten et al. and other researchers (including Karmarkar himself)' 2 also
sought to improve the performance of Karmarkar's algorithm in cases where its
calculations involved sparse matrices (i.e., matrices that have very few nonzero
elements).' 24 By using fast sparse matrix algorithms for "Cholesky factorization,"
an important subroutine used in the numerical solution of systems of linear
equations, Marsten et al. were able to accelerate a procedure that accounts for
about ninety percent of the running time of Karmarkar's
algorithm in practice,' 25
26
thereby addressing the algorithm's "main weakness."'
In 1991, one of Marsten's coauthors, Matthew Saltzman, addressed concerns
about Karmarkar's algorithm and patent to an even wider community by posting
a long message to the USENET discussion group sci.math.num-analysis
summarizing the points made in the Marsten et al. article. 2 1 Saltzman also goes
on to question the novelty of, and sufficiency of disclosure in, Karmarkar's
patent, and opines: "IMH-O, this patent has not benefitted society. If faster LP
[linear programming] algorithms are a benefit28 to society, then the benefit has
occurred despite, not because of the patent.'
Given Gill et al.'s self-styled equivalence result, Marsten et al.'s apparent desire
to write Karmarkar out of the mathematical programming history books, and
subsequent advances in sparse-matrix calculations, it is easy to see how a casual
reader of the technical literature might be left in doubt as to Karmarkar's
contributions and even be persuaded by a research scientist's uninformed legal
opinion on the validity of Karmarkar's patent. For purposes of legal inquiry into
the validity and scope of Karmarkar's patent, however, Bessen and Meurer need
not have relied on these scientists' conclusory and somewhat misleading
descriptions of "an equivalence between Karmarkar's method and projected

122

Id.

123 See Ilan Adler et al.,An Impkmentation of armarkar'sAlgorithmforLinearProgramming,
44 MATH.

PROGRAMMING 297 (1989) (naming Karmarkar as co-author); Ilan Adler et al., DataStructuresand
ProgrammingTechniquesfor the Impkmentation of Karmarkar'sAlorithm, 1 ORSAJ. COMPUTER 84 (1989)

(same).

124 Marsten et al., supra note 108, at 111.
125

Id.

'2f Id. at 112.
12 Posting of Matthew Saltzman to USENET discussion group sci.math.num-analysis, http://

www.cs.uvic.ca/-wendym/courses/445/06/interiorpoint.txt (Mar. 24,1991,20:39:35 GMT), cited
in BESSEN & MEURER, spra note 6, at 312.
128 Id.
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a precise statement of Gill et al.'s actual existence
Newton barrier methods" when
29
available.
already
result was
3. Karmarkar's Contributions Relative to the Prior Art. Contrary to Bessen and
Meurer's assertion, Gill et al. did not demonstrate "that Karmarkar's algorithm is
equivalent to a class of techniques that was known and applied to linear
problems."' 3 ° Gill et al.'s existence result shows only that some of Frisch's and
Fiacco and McCormick's methods can be tailored so that the resulting algorithm
proceeds to search the same iterates as Karmarkar's algorithm. The necessary
tailoring choices for this result, however, were not "known and applied" during
the 1960s, and the available evidence (discussed below) strongly indicates 3' that
the choices were neither known nor obvious until Karmarkar's algorithm
appeared. Thus, it would be blatant hindsight reconstruction to cite these choices,
art against a 1984
first publicly embodied in Gill et al.'s 1986 results, as13prior
2
invention as Bessen and Meurer and Saltzman suggest.
In a 1994 treatise on interior point methods, Dick den Hertog describes the
range of design choices available to .users of the Frisch/Fiacco-McCormick
methods. 33 Specifically, he identifies the following three "important elements in
the design of such a method: (1) the [iterative] method used to (approximately)
minimize [the logarithmic barrier function]; (2) the criterion to terminate this
approximate minimization; and (3) the updating scheme for the barrier parameter
.,,134

Karmarkar's algorithm provided significant new advances with respect to all
three of these design elements. First, as Michael Todd explains in a 2002 article,
Karmarkar's use of a projective transformation to "normalize" or "center" each
iterate 13 represented a "very intriguing" new idea at the time for minimizing the
logarithmic barrier function.' 36 Second, Todd writes, another new idea was the

" See supra note 35 and accompanying text. Bessen and Meurer also appear to have been
influenced by Saltzman's posting, which questions the validity of Karmarkar's patent on novelty and
disclosure grounds and cites the Gill and Marsten articles. Saltzman, supra note 127.
130 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 6, at 202.
131 Id.
132 See id. at 203 ('Would anyone have seen Karmarkar's algorithm as novel in light of the
techniques used in the 1960s? Certainly not after 1986, when their equivalence was proved.");
Saltzman, supra note 127 ("A case can be made for prior art, though .... Gill, et al. (1986) showed
that in fact, Karmarkar's method was equivalent to a projected Newton barrier algorithm.').
133 D. DEN HERTOG, INTERIOR POINT APPROACH TO LINEAR, QUADRATIC AND CONVEX
PROGRAMMING (1994).
134

Id. at 12.

135 See U.S. Patent No. 4,744,028 col. 10 (filed Apr. 19, 1995) ("This projective transformation

can be thought of as an orthogonal transformation into the unit simplex, thereby achieving the
normalizing or centering property.').
136 See Todd, spra note 102, at 426-27. Todd adds that while "projective transformations are
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use of "a nonlinear potential function, invariant under
such transformations" to
13
measure progress toward the termination condition. 1
Finally, as Dave Bayer andJeffrey Lagarias note, Karmarkar's updating scheme
for tdiffers from any method in which successive values of tare determined as
a function of the current iterate y,13s such as that employed by Fiacco and
McCormick. 139 There is nothing in any of Bessen and Meurer's sources to suggest
that Karmarkar's scheme for/u was obvious prior to his invention. Even Gill et
al. do not reveal any motivation for their choice of a particular value for/u beyond
emulating the iterative behavior of Karmarkar's algorithm after the fact. In
describing their main theorem as "an existence result," they note that "[t]his does
not mean that the [Frisch/Fiacco-McCormick]
barrier method should be
4
specialized" by setting/u to this value.'
In the patent law context, the algorithm that results from Karmarkar's
combination of design choices is most accurately characterized as a "range or
value of a particular variable" that is included within a wider range disclosed in the
prior art: namely, the entire class ofFrisch/Fiacco-McCormick barrier methods. 4
An invention of this type is presumed obvious,4 2 but this presumption may be
' 43
rebutted by a showing that the range "produces new and unexpected results."'
As a general matter, there is ample evidence available to rebut the presumption
of obviousness raised by the Frisch/Fiacco-McCormick prior art. Karmarkar's
innovation-an easily implemented linear algorithm with a O(n 2 )-factor speedup
over the previous world record, and the first interior-point algorithm to be shown

not used much in interior-point methods nowadays[, t]he key concept of making a transformation
or changing the metric so the current iterate is in some sense far from the boundary remains highly
valuable." Id. at 427.
117Id.at 427.
"' See D.A. Bayer & J.C. Lagarias, Karmarkar'sAlgorithm and Newton's Method, 50 MATH.
PROGRAMMING 291, 293 (1991) ("[flf (y)is considered to be a function ofy then the projected
Newton method direction of [the barrier function] is usually not the projective scaling direction.").
139 In the Fiacco-McCormick method, successive values of the barrier parameter (denoted therein
by the variable r rather than 4i) are chosen by a "computing rule" that chooses values for r that
minimize the norm of the gradient of the barrier function V(y)at the point y. FIACCO &
McCORMICK, supra note 92, at 116.
140 Gill et al., supra note 106, at 191 (emphasis in original).
141 See, e.g., Haynes Int'l, Inc. v.Jessop Steel Co., 8 F.3d 1573, 1577 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("[W]hen
the difference between the claimed invention and the prior art is the range or value of a particular
variable, then a prima facie rejection is properly established when the difference in range or value is
minor." (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted)).
142 Id.at 1577, 1577 n.3.
113 Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 1311 (Fed. Cit. 2006); see also Iron Grip
Barbell Co. v. USA Sports, Inc., 392 F.3d 1317, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (discussing rebuttal of
presumption of obviousness when range disdosed in prior art); In reGeisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1469-70
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (same).
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to run in polynomial time-were, at the time, as new and unexpected as any
developments in all of applied mathematics.'" Bessen and Meurer do correctly
observe that without Marsten et al.'s later-developed sparse matrix techniques,
"Karmarkar's algorithm by itself was not particularly efficient compared to the
linear-programming techniques of the 1940s.''
Still, this observation takes
nothing away from the new and unexpected nature of these achievements,
particularly in the context of patent doctrine's minimalist approach to the general
146

utility requirement.
The idea of borrowing interior-point methods from nonlinear programming

to compete with advanced exterior-point methods for linear programming was
also unexpected, as Margaret Wright writes:
Prior to 1984, there was, to first order, no connection between
linear and nonlinear programming. For historical reasons that seem
puzzling in retrospect, these topics, one a strict subset of the other,
evolved along two essentially disjoint paths.
Even more
remarkably, this separation was a fully accepted part of the culture
of optimization-indeed,
it was viewed by some as inherent and
147
unavoidable.
Wright concludes that Karmarkar's algorithm catalyzed an "interior point
revolution," uniting the two branches of mathematical programming in an
unexpected way.

148

144See, e.g., Chin, supra note * (describing presentation of Karmarkar's algorithm to a "packed

audience of MAA [Mathematical Association of America] members" at the 1985 Joint Mathematics
Meetings).
4 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 6, at 202.

1 To be eligible for a patent, a claimed invention need not supersede or work better than the
prior art. See Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568) (rejecting
argument that a claimed pump lacks general utility unless it is "for the public, a better pump than
the common pump").
4 Margaret H. Wright, The Interior-PointRevolution in OptimiZation: History, Recent Developments, and
Lasting Consequences, 42 BULL. AM. MATH. SOC'Y 39, 40 (2005) (emphasis in original), available at
http://www.ams.org/joumals/bull/2005-42-O1/home.html. Fiacco and McCormick's book does
briefly discuss the application of interior-point methods to linear programming. See FIAcco &
McCoRNCK, supra note 92, at 111-12, 180-83. The book's emphasis, however, is on examining
special cases of the more general techniques presented (in which linearity, convexity, or both serve
as simplifying assumptions), rather than on presenting methods that are efficient in comparison with
other linear programming algorithms. Id.
148Wright, supra note 147, at 39-40; see also Mark A. Paley, The KarmarkarPatent: Why Congress
Should "Open the Door" to Algorithms as Patentable Sub'ect Matter, 22 COMPUTER L. REP. 7 (1995)
(describing Karmarkar's algorithm as "a revolutionary problem solving method").
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Of course, Bessen and Meurer's validity concerns must be directed to
Karmarkar's individual patent claims, each of which is subject to separate novelty
and nonobviousness determinations according to its scope.'49 For this reason, we
turn now to address Bessen and Meurer's concerns regarding the scope of
Karmarkar's claims.
4. The Scope ofKarmarkar'sPatentClaims. Bessen and Meurer express concern
about the difficulty of determining the boundaries of Karmarkar's patent,
specifically the possibility that Karmarkar's patent claims might read on "the
techniques used in the 1960s."'' ° Any such claim would be of questionable
novelty in light of the prior art, and might unjustly enrich AT&T by enabling it
"to assert its patent successfully against people who used linear-programming
techniques based on those used in the 1960s."'1' Bessen and Meurer do not
identify any particular claim language as giving rise to these concerns, but instead
appeal to what they view as software's inherent and distinctive resistance to
linguistic line-drawing.
The abstractness of the patented algorithm means that these
determinations cannot be made with certainty. Patent law assumes
that two technologies can be unambiguously determined to be
equivalent or distinct; this sets the patent boundaries. Yet for
software, this assumption simply does not hold. Although this
assumption works for most other technologies, it distinctly does
not-or does so insufficiently well-for software algorithms. And
if computer scientists cannot make these determinations with any
certainty, how can we expect judges and juries to do so?152
Setting aside the fact that disputes over ambiguous claim scope arise in every
technological field, this is a circular argument. Ultimately, the full extent of the
Karmarkar example's support for Bessen and Meurer's argument that "software
patents are different" turns on this one paragraph blanket assertion that software
"distinctly does not" satisfy the linguistic assumptions that work "for most other
technologies."' 53

'4

See, e.g., 800 Adept, Inc. v. Murex Sec., Ltd., 539 F.3d 1354,1368 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("Under the

patent statute, the validity of each claim must be considered separately.").
's

BESSEN & MEURER, supranote 6, at 203.

1sI
Id.

This is not a real-world concern, since Karmarkar's patent expired in 2005. U.S. Patent

No. 4,744,028 (filed Apr. 19, 1985).
152

Id.

153

BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 6, at 203.
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A complete construction of all of Karmarkar's patent claims is far beyond the
scope of this Article. It is relatively straightforward, however, to address Bessen
and Meurer's concerns about overbreadth here.
As shown in Figure 5, Karmarkar's patent has thirty-six claims, of which
twenty-two are independent and fourteen are dependent.154 Nine of the claims
(19, 24, 25, 28-31, 33, and 34), including three independent claims, expressly
recite mathematical terms that refer specifically to Karmarkar's particular design
choices within the class of Frisch/Fiacco-McCormick methods as described in the
patent specification.' 55
Each of the remaining independent claims recites the word "means" or "step"
in connection with at least one functional aspect of Karmarkar's projective
transformation (indicated by the terms quoted in Figure 5) without any "structure,
material, or acts" to implement that function.'56 Accordingly, § 112, 6 provides
that these means-plus-function and step-plus-function claims be limited in scope
to algorithms that implement a projective transformation as described in the
specification.' 57

154 See infra pp. 225-26.
155

See U.S. Patent No. 4,744,028 cols. 7-8 (filed Apr. 19, 1985) (describing the mathematical

steps needed to perform the projective transformation prior to the minimization step during each
iteration).
156 The statute provides:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step
for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or
acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the
corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and
equivalents thereof.
35 U.S.C. § 112, 6 (2000).
157 See Harris Corp. v. Ericsson Inc., 417 F.3d 1241, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (restricting computerimplemented means-plus-function terms to algorithm disclosed in the specification); WMS Gaming
Inc. v. Int'l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1348-49 (Fed. Cit. 1999) (same); see also Aristocrat Tech.
Aust. Pry. Ltd. v. Int'l Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328, 1333-38 (Fed. Cit. 2008) (holding computer
implemented means-plus-function limitations of claims lacked sufficient disclosure of structure
without algorithm).
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Claim

Dependent

Means-Plus-

Step-Plus

Function

Function

Express

#

Claim(s) #

Function

Function

Implemented by

Implemented by

Limitation

Element(s)

Element(s)

Projective

Potential

to Projective

Transfornmation

Function

Transfornation

1

0

2

"selecting"

0

3

4,5,6,7

8

9,10,11,12

"nonnalizing"

*

"centralizing"

*

"selecting"

13

0

"selecting"

14

0

"nortnalizing"

15

0

"normalizing"

16

6

"normalizing"

17

"stepping"

0

18

0

"normalizing"

19

"vector c"

20

0

"transforming"

"substantially
coincident"

21

"trsnsformng

"
"substantially
corresponds"

22

"identifying"

0

23

0

"transforning"

24

"projective
transfornation x'

25

"pointer vector c;"

26
27

28,29,30

0

"centralizing"

0

"ttansforming.

"satisfactory
minimization"

28

"matrix B"

29

"orthogonal
projection"
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"new transformed

31

initial vector"

"radius"

31
32

33

0

"transforming"

"satisfactory
mramzation"

33

"matrix B"

34

"orthogonal

34

projection"
35

0

"rescaled"

36

0

"rescaling"

Figure 5. Each one of the thirty-six claims in Karmarkar's patent appears to have
at least one express limitation or § 112, 6 functional element that narrows its scope
sufficiently to address Bessen and Meurer's concerns.
It therefore appears that all thirty-six claims are limited in scope to the
disclosed implementation of Karmarkar's projective transformation, and at least
eight of the claims are further limited in scope to the disclosed implementation
of Karmarkar's potential function. Far from exploiting the ambiguity of language
to attain overbroad claim scope, Karmarkar's software patent claims are cabined
by express recitals and by § 112, 6 into the very design choices that accurately
represent his contributions relative to the prior art.
C. DISCUSSION

Apart from the failure of Bessen and Meurer's illustrations to support their
contentions about the unique linguistic unwieldiness of software-related
inventions, the contentions themselves seem deeply counterintuitive. Perhaps
more than any other technological field, the disciplines of computer science and
software engineering must rely on mathematically precise specifications of the
designs and behaviors of their creations. For this reason, the pervasiveness of
abstraction in software technology per se does not doom the field to ambiguous
line-drawing. Computer scientists are well aware that their work involves
abstraction; the best computer scientists are able to express that abstraction with
precision and rigor. 5 ' The real question for software patent doctrine is not how

t"8 See generaly Jeff Kramer, Is Abstracion the Key to Computing?, 50 COMM. OF THE ACM,
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to drive abstraction out of the patent system, but how the law can affirm and
harness cognitive abstraction skills to promote innovation rather than allow their
abuse to evade otherwise generally applicable requirements for patentability.
III.

KIEMENS

A. KLEMENS'S PROPOSAL

Software-related inventions have historically created difficulties for the courts
in attempting to draw the line between
patentable and unpatentable subject
matter. The march from Benson" 9 and Diehr 60 to Alappa,' State Street Bank,' 162
and Bilski?63 has been long and sinuous, and may not be finished."
Klemens argues that the line drawn by the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals in the Freeman-Walter-Abeleline of cases 16 and repudiated by the Federal
Circuit in State Street Bank 66 should be restored. 167 Klemens favors the test
because it effectively distinguishes between "bona fide physical inventions" and

Apr. 2007, at 37 (2007) (discussing the importance of abstraction skills in the computer science
profession).
"' Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 63 (1972) (holding unpatentable claims to a method for
converting binary coded decimal number representations into binary number representations).
"6 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191-93 (1981) (holding patentable a claimed method of
operating a rubber-molding press reciting steps of a mathematical algorithm for calculating the cure
time based on the Arrhenius equation).
"6'
In reAlappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1545 (Fed. Cit. 1994) (holding a general-purpose machine
programmed to perform a series of computational steps patentable as a "new machine").
162 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cit. 1998)
(holding the transformation of financial data through a series ofmathematical calculations patentable
as producing "a useful, concrete and tangible result').
163 In reBilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cit. 2008) (en banc) (holding unpatentable a claimed process
for managing financial risks as neither tied to a particular machine nor resulting in a physical
transformation).
164 See id.
at 994-95 (Newman, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority decision leaves open the
questions of whether "Alappats guidance that software converts a general purpose computer into
a special purpose machine remains applicable" and whether the inventions in State St. Bank, 149
F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cit. 1998), and AT&T v. Excel, 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cit. 1999), are patentable
subject matter).
165 In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1245 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In reWalter, 618 F.2d 758, 767
(C.C.P.A. 1980); In reAbele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982); see also Arrhythmia Res. Tech., Inc. v.
Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1058 (Fed. Cit. 1992) (summarizing text).
166 See State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1374 ("]he Freeman-Walter-Abele test has little, if any,
applicability to determining the presence of statutory subject matter.").
167 See Klemens, supra note 4, at 14-15 (discussing benefits of Freeman-Walter-Abele test); 35
(restating the paper's recommendation as a "regression" to the practice of "respecting the caveats
about postsolution activity in the Freeman-Walter-Abele test").
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"information processing algorithms with a trivial physical step" such as operation
of a standard I/O device and takes seriously the Supreme Court's dictum in Diehr
that "insignificant postsolution activity will not transform an unpatentable
principle into a patentable process.' 6 Specifically, Klemens's proposal is to
exclude from § 101 patentable subject matter all combination claims of the
following form:
PATENT N
Claim 1. A useful computing machine, comprising
(a) a mathematical algorithm, which may be creatively and
painstakingly derived, but which is clearly unpatentable by the
mathematical algorithm exception, and
(b) an obvious physical step such as loading the algorithm onto
a stock computer, which meets the requirements for patentable
subject matter but is unpatentable because it is not novel. 69
Klemens contends that "the great majority of software patent applications are
clearly of the form 7of
Patent N: an algorithm loaded onto an obvious stock
°
computing device."'
The "machine-or-transformation" test articulated in the Federal Circuit's
recent en banc decision in In re Bilski'7l calls for critical inquiries that nominally
address Klemens' concerns whether the claimed process "is tied to a particular
machine or apparatus" (as opposed to the entire universe of digital computers)
or "transforms a particular article into a different state or thing" (as opposed to

16sId at 36 (explaining importance of "respecting the declaration" in Dieh6.
169

This appears to be a refinement of Klemens's earlier proposal that for a programmed general-

purpose computer to be patentable,
a machine would have to be built that may rely on mathematics but does
something innovative beyond it .... If the entire design [of the machine]
consists of an equation, then there is nothing to be patented; if the design
consists of an equation and a trivial machine, then there is still nothing to be
patented; if the design is for a new and novel machine informed by mathematics,
then there is every reason to grant a patent on the machine's design.
Even as such, Klemens's conflation of "obvious" with "not novel" in paragraph (b) of his "Patent
N" example suggests that further refinement is necessary. Klemens, supranote 4, at 10; KLEMENS,
spra note 2, at 64. In his book, Klemens also proposes that "an inventive physical implementation
of a state machine (such as an FPGA [field-programmable gate array], aJVM [Java Virtual Machine]
on a chip, or a rubber-curing device) should be patentable, whereas the programs loaded onto them
(firmware, a data structure) should not." Id at 64-65. Klemens's reading of the Church-Turing
thesis does not impinge on the merits of this proposal, and this Article will not opine on them.
170 Klemens, supra note 4, at 36.
171 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
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insignificant post-solution or extra-solution activity). 72 The decision is unlikely
to satisfy Klemens, however, as it applies only to process claims,' 3 rejects the
Freeman-Walter-Abele approach,'7 4 and (as Klemens himself notes)' leaves open
the question of whether the act of loading an algorithm onto a stock computer
produces a "particular machine."' 76 The Bilski court also took pains to state as
settled doctrine that the patentable subject matter inquiry is to be directed to the
claim as a whole 177 and is to be completely independent of any novelty or
nonobviousness considerations, 7 ' thereby making it clear that Klemens's
approach to the validity of machine claims has no place in current 5 101
jurisprudence.
Like Bessen and Meurer, Klemens supports his proposal for legal change in
large part with empirical research on the economic costs of the status quo to both
the patent system' 79 and the software industry.8
In the context of a policy
argument directed to Congress, this research might prove to be highly useful and
persuasive. The other part of Klemens's case, however, is based on an imprecise
and superficial reading of the theoretical computer science literature. Klemens
repeatedly argues that a widely adopted working hypothesis in computer science,
known as the Church-Turing thesis, compels a doctrinal change in the application
of the § 101 patentable subject matter requirement to software generally and

172 Id. at 953-54 (contrasting Benson with Diehn, 957 n.14 (citing cases).
173
174

Id. at 951.
See id. at 958-59 ("[I]t appears to conflict with the Supreme Court's prescription against

dissecting a claim and evaluating patent-eligibility on the basis of individual limitations.").
171 See In regards to In re Bilski, http://ben.klemens.org/blog/arch/00000009.htm (Oct. 31, 2008)
(stating Klemens's view, in a blog entry one day after the decision, that "the ruling does make progress"
but "won't answer the key, central question").
176545 F.3d at 994 (Newman, J., dissenting) ("We aren't told when, or if, software instructions
implemented on a general purpose computer are deemed 'tied' to a 'particular machine'....").
17 See id. at 958 ("[T]he Court has made clear that it is inappropriate to determine the patenteligibility of a claim as a whole based on whether selected limitations constitute patent-eligible subject
matter. ... Thus, it is irrelevant that any individual step or limitation of such processes by itself
would be unpatentable under § 101." (citations omitted)).
17s See id ("[Tihe Court has held that whether a claimed process is novel or non-obvious is
irrelevant to the § 101 analysis. Rather, such considerations are governed by 35 U.S.C. § 102
(novelty) and § 103 (non-obviousness)." (citations omitted)).
179 See KLEMENS, smpra note 2, at 84 (patent thickets); 90-91 (uncertainty caused by
litigation); 107 (favors an industry in decline); Klemens, supra note 4, at 27-32 (transaction costs of
patents).
1s0 See KLEmENS, supra note 2, at 92-107 (decentralized software market); Klemens, supranote 4,
at 21-27 (patent trolls in software and business methods).
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Patent N specifically. 1s It does not, and any courts
to whom Klemens addresses
82
this argument should be informed accordingly.
B. THE CHURCH-TURING THESIS

The Church-Turing thesis is the outgrowth of contemporaneous efforts by
computer science pioneers Alonzo Church and Alan Turing to define the class of
mathematical problems that were amenable to solution by computer. 83 Turing's
theory developed around the Turing machine model,"s while Church's work
focused on a notation for expressing algorithms as functions known as the
lambda calculus. 85 The Turing machine is described in detail elsewhere in this
Article; 86 what now follows is a very brief introduction to a few of the concepts
87
behind Church's lambda calculus.
One reason for using the lambda calculus is the latent ambiguity that may exist
even in a simple mathematical expression like x -. 88 Is this a function of x or
ofy (or both, or neither)? We could clarify the situation by writing f(x) = x-y,
but this forces another symbol, f, into the discussion. This might seem a small
181 See infra Part III.c.
182

See End Software Patents Project, EndSoftware Patents:ResouresforLayers,http://endsoftpat

ents.org/resources-for-lawyers (last visited Feb. 8, 2009) (describing efforts by Klemens's End
Software Patents Project to engage the legal community).
183 See MARTIN DAVIS, THE UNIVERSAL COMPUTER:
THE ROAD FROM LEIBNIZ TO
TURING 163-67 (2000) (providing a historical account of Turing's and Church's independent work
on David Hilbert's famous algorithmically unsolvable problem, the Entscheidungsproblem).
184 Alan M. Turing, On ConputableNumbers wtb anApphcation to the Entscbeidunprobkm,
42 PROC.
LONDON MATHEMATICAL Soc. 230 (1937).
185 ALONZO CHURCH, THE CALCULI OF LAMBDA-CONVERSION (1941).
s A caveat: The Turing machine model described earlier, supranotes 39-42 and accompanying
text, is limited to evaluating Boolean-valued ("yes" or "no") functions. It is straightforward (but
uninteresting for present purposes) to extend the model to evaluate more general functions. See
JOHN E. HOPCROFT & JEFFREY D. ULLMAN, INTRODUCTION TO AUTOMATA THEORY,
LANGUAGES, AND COMPUTATION 151 (1979) (describing Turing machine as a computer of integer
functions), and also infra Appendix (presenting an example of a Turing machine that outputs a string
of plus-signs). It is this unrestricted model that is the subject of the following discussion.
187 There are actually several varieties of "lambda calculi," including "typed lambda calculi" in
which terms may be given one of a number of "type" designations, each of which is subject to
certain specified syntactic restrictions. SeeJ. ROGER HINDLEY &JONATHAN P. SELDIN, LAMBDACALCULUS AND COMBINATORS: AN INTRODUCTION 1 (2008) (discussing varieties of lambda
calculus), id. at 107-219 (surveying various typed varieties). As the discussion in this Article and in
Klemens's writings concerns only the untyped lambda calculus, this Article hereinafter adopts
Klemens's practice of referring to the untyped lambda calculus as simply "the lambda calculus."
KLEMENS, supranote 2, at 26, 35--36, 42-43, 50.
1s8 See HINDLEY & SELDIN, supra note 187, at 1 (explaining that notions designating functions
of x andy become "clumsy" when higher-order functions are implicated).
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complication, but it might be difficult to keep track of such details over the course
of a long computation.
Church's solution is to use the special symbol A to distinguish between two
kinds of variables that may appear in a mathematical expression.'89 In Church's
lambda calculus, the notation (Ax.x -y) indicates that the expression x -y is a
function of x.190 A variable such as x that is preceded by A is known as a "bound
variable"; a variable such as y that is not preceded by A is known as a "free
variable.' 9 The notation (Ax.x-y) is treated as a function that can be evaluated
for specified values of the bound variable A by substitution (e.g.,
(Ax-y)(1) = 1 _y).12

It is sometimes useful to make the act of substitution more explicit. The
lambda calculus provides a "bracket-slash" notation to do this. Thus, the
foregoing evaluation can also be written (Ax.x -y) (1) = [1 /x](x -y) = 1 -y. The
notation [1 /x] indicates that in the immediately following expression (i.e., x-J),
each occurrence of x is to be replaced by . 9
The validity of replacing (.x.x -y) (1) with [1 /x] (x -y) in the lambda calculus
is due to the fact that the lambda calculus includes a number of defined rules for
converling expressions. This particular conversion rule is known as a /3fl-reductions can be used iteratively to dramatic effect, as the
reduction.'
following example illustrates:

(x. (iy. yx)z)v

=

v / X] ((AY. yx)z) = (Ay. yv)z = [z /iy](yv) = zv

*19

Space precludes a complete presentation of Church's system here, but it
should already be apparent that the evaluation and conversion of expressions in
the lambda calculus generates a powerful set of computational techniques. In
fact, Church's system is known to be as powerful as the Turing machine model,
because Turing proved in 1937 that any function that could be computed on196a
Turing machine could also be evaluated in the lambda calculus, and vice versa.
Over time, Church and Turing's work inspired the belief among computer
scientists that the class of Turing-computable (or lambda-evaluable) functions
includes every function that can be computed on any plausible computing device.

19
190

Id.at 1-2.
Id.

191 Id. at
192

6-7.

Id. at 2.

193 Id. at 7.
194 Id. at

11-12.

195Id at 12.
196 Alan M. Turing, Computabii0 and A-Definabioy, 2 J. SYMsfBOLC LOGIC 153 (1937).
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The assumption that the class of Turing-computable functions will continue to
be the same as the class of all machine-computable functions, has become known
as the Church-Turing thesis (though sometimes referred to as Church's
hypothesis).'97
Since no one can claim to have envisioned every computing device that will
ever be invented, the notion of a "computable function" has never been
formalized. Meanwhile, however, computer scientists have been proving
equivalence (or Turing-completeness) results involving a wide range of
programming languages 9 ' and abstract computational models,' 99 giving credence
to the Church-Turing thesis and further research that relies upon it as a working
hypothesis.0° As a famous theoretical computer science textbook describes this
ongoing research program: "While we cannot hope to 'prove' Church's
hypothesis as long as the informal notion of 'computable' remains an informal
notion, we can give evidence for its reasonableness."'
C. KLEMENS'S READING(S) OF THE CHURCH-TURING THESIS

Apart from referring to an unproven hypothesis as a "theorem," Klemens's
description in Math You Can't Use of the Church-Turing thesis as "[t]he theorem
central to this book" 20 2 is more than apt. To Klemens, the Church-Turing thesis
is a panacea for the courts' ill-conceived doctrines on the patentability of
software. In both his book and his article, he cites it in support of a dizzying
variety of propositions.
1. 'Anything a computer couldpossiby do" can be done by a Turing machine. Klemens
introduces the Church-Turing thesis in the following passage:

197 SeeJOHN E. HOPCROFT &JEFFREY D. ULLMAN, INTRODUCTION TO AUTOMATA THEORY,
LANGUAGES, AND COMPUTATION 166 (1979) (supporting the reasonableness of the thesis "[a] s long
as our intuitive notion of 'computable' places no bound on the number of steps or the amount of
storage").
19 See, e.g., Robert S. Boyer &J. Strother Moore, A MechanicalProofof the Turing Completeness of Pure
Lisp, in AUTOMATED THEOREM PROVING: AFTER 25 YEARs 133, 141 (W.W. Bledsoe & D.W.
Loveland eds., 1984) (providing that any function that can be evaluated by a Turing machine can be
evaluated by some program in LISP [List Processing Language]).
199See, e.g., HOPCROFT & ULLMAN, supranote 197, at 167-74 (presenting equivalence results for
various abstract computational models).
29 See, e.g., Arthur Charlesworth, Infinite Loops in Computer Programs, 52 MATHEMATICS
MAG. 284, 287-88 (1979) (providing a new proof of one of Turing's theorems, subject to the
assumption that the Church-Turing thesis is true).
201 HOPCROFT & ULLMAN, supra note 197, at 166.
m KLEMENS, supra note 2, at 47. Klemens introduces the Church-Turing thesis in his

subsequent article no less inaccurately as "a basic result of computer science."
note 4, at 9.
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THEOREM 1: The Church-Turing Thesis
All computable operations can be evaluated by a Turing
machine.
The exact meaning of computable is a technical matter that I will
not delve into here; roughly, it means "anything a computer could
possibly do." The Church-Turing thesis states that any computer
program, written in any language, can be rewritten as a Turing
03
machine.

2. The Church-Turingthesis indicatesthat "there is a mechanicalmeans of translatingany
mathematicalexpressioninto a computableprogram,and a means oftranslatingany computable
program into a mathematicalexpression. ,204
3. Software is indistinguishablefrom pure mathematics. In his book, Klemens
reasons that "[s]ince any program in any Turing complete programming language
is identical to a system of equations in the lambda calculus, the courts will be
unable to draw" the line between pure mathematics and software.2 5 In his article,
Klemens simply states that the Church-Turing thesis directly implies that "all
software is mathematics. '"206

4. Every applicationofan algorithm is indistinguishablefrompuremathematics; therefore,
claim 1 ofpatent N should be held invalid. David Gale and Lloyd Shapley conclude
their 1962 American MatbematicalMonthy article announcing their algorithm for
solving the "stable marriage problem" with some reflections from the perspective
of economists working on a problem of more general interest to
mathematicians.2 7 They write: "In making the special assumptions needed in
order to analyze our problem mathematically, we necessarily moved further away
from the original college admission question, and eventually in discussing the
marriage problem, we abandoned reality altogether and entered the world of
208
mathematical make-believe."
Klemens first quotes and later paraphrases this comment as follows: "As Gale
and Shapley explained, there is no difference between an application of an
algorithm and the algorithm itself."20 9 He then reminds the reader that "as the
Church-Turing thesis states, the algorithm and pure math are entirely

203KLEMENS, supra note 2, at 35.

o Klemens, supra note 4, at 9-10.
's

KLEMENS, supra note 2, at 36.

2 Klemens, supra note 4, at 10.
207David Gale & Lloyd S. Shapley, College Admissions and the Stabio of Marriage, 69 AM.
MATHEMATIC MONTHLY 9, 14-15 (1962).
Id. at 14, quoted in KLEMENS, supranote 2, at 48-49.
209KLEMENS, supra note 2, at 63.
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equivalent."21 Klemens makes these points to imply the PTO erroneously
granted several patents that were directed to "a general-purpose computer with
a program loaded." ''
212
5. Owning a software patent is the same as "own[ingJ a piece of mathemaics."
Klemens provides no explanation for this conclusion, but it appears to follow
from propositions 3 and 4.
6. Ifsoftware had beenpatentablein the 1930s, the Church-Turingthesis might not have
been developed. Noting the contemporaneous development of the lambda calculus
by Church and the Turing machine by Turing, Klemens reasons that "any such
'
hyphenated theorem [sic] would be a lawsuit in the making. "213
7. 'It is impossible to write a section of the Manualof PatentExamination Procedure
(MPEP)that allows thepatentingofsoftware but excludesfrompatentability the evaluationof
'
purey mathematical algorithms."214
Klemens states that "the proof' of this
proposition is to be found in "the formal Church-Turing thesis" and Donald
Knuth's comment that "[A]ll data are numbers, and all numbers are data."2 '
D. DISCUSSION

Read in context, Klemens's repeated mischaracterizations of the ChurchTuring thesis as a proven theorem are not really that problematic. Like computer
scientists, the law can draw conclusions from unrebutted presumptions, and it
would be highly prudent to do so on the massive body of evidence that now
exists. An alternative interpretation, also in Klemens's favor, is that in citing the
Church-Turing thesis he might actually be referring instead to the body of
evidence that supports the thesis (i.e., such as proven Turing-completeness results
for numerous languages and machine models). This, however, is the least serious
of Klemens's errors.
More serious is Klemens's overstatement of the Church-Turing thesis. As
explained above, the Church-Turing thesis arises out of Turing's proof of an
equivalence between Church's lambda calculus and the Turing machine.216 The
precise nature of this equivalence is crucial. Specifically, Turing showed that any
function that could be computed on a Turing machine could also be evaluated in

210

Id.

211 Id.
212
213
214
215

Id. at 63.
Id. at 47.
Klemens, sypra note 4, at 10.
Id. at 9-10 (citing Letter from Donald Knuth, Professor Emeritus, to Commissioner of

Patents and Trademarks, Patent and Trademark Office, availableathttp://progfree.org/Patents/Kn
uth-to-pto.txt).
216 See supra Part III.B.
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the lambda calculus, and vice versa.2 1 The Church-Turing thesis claims that this
particular equivalence-between the classes of functions that can be computed
using the respective models-can be extended even to the most powerful
plausible models of computation. 1 8
In an article entitled "The Church-Turing Thesis: Breaking the Myth,"
computer scientists Dina Goldin and Peter Wegner address precisely the same
commonly held misunderstanding that informs much of Kiemens's
commentary.1 9 Goldin and Wegner state the Church-Turing thesis as follows:
"Whenever there is an effective method (algorithm) for obtaining the values of
a mathematical function, the function can be computed by a TM [Turing
machine].""22 They go on, however, to report that the thesis "has since been
reinterpreted to imply that Turing Machines model all computation, rather than
just functions," to the effect that "[a] TM can do (compute) anything that a
computer can do."' 22 ' They respond that "[ijt is a myth that the original ChurchTuring thesis is equivalent to this interpretation of it; Turing himself would have
222
denied it.
Goldin and Wegner's insights rebut the first four of Klemens's propositions.
With respect to the first, the Church-Turing thesis does not imply that a Turing
machine can emulate "anything a computer could possibly do., 223 As Goldin and
Wegner point out, and every reasonably sophisticated computer user should be
able to recognize, modern computers do much more than
evaluate functions; they
224
also interact with their users and their environments.

217See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
211

See supra note 196 and accompanying text.

29 Dina Goldin & Peter Wegner, The Church-Turing Thesis: Breaking the Myth, in NEW

COMPUTATIONAL PARADIGMS 152, 154 (S. Barry Cooper et al. eds., 2005) (opining that the myth
"is dogmatically accepted by most computer scientists"). Goldin and Wegner state that at least one
popular undergraduate textbook contains the erroneous reinterpretation. See id.
(citing MICHAEL
SIPSER, INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF COMPUTATION (Course Technology 2d ed. 2005)
(1997)). The allegedly offending textbook does not actually offer a formal statement of the ChurchTuring thesis, however, but says that the term refers to the "connection between the informal notion
of algorithm and the precise definition" supplied by the lambda calculus and Turing machine models.
SlPSER, supra, at 143.

' Goldin & Wegner, supra note 219, at 153.
221
22

Id.at 153-54.
Id. at 154.

See spra note 203 and accompanying text.
4 See Goldin & Wegner, supranote 219, at 156 (giving example of a robotic car); Peter Wegner
& Dina Goldin, Computafion Byond TuringMachines,46 COMM. OF THE ACM, Apr. 2003, at 100, 101
("The field of computing has greatly expanded since the 1960s, and it has been increasingly
recognized that artificial intelligence, graphics and the Interet could not be expressed by Turing
machines. In each case, interactionbetween the program and the world (environmen) that takes place
during computation plays a key role that cannot be replaced by any set of inputs determined prior
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Regarding Klemens's second proposition, a proof that a particular
computational model or programming language is Turing-complete only requires
a showing that it can compute all Turing-computable functions; it does not
necessarily entail the construction of a "mechanical means of translating"
algorithms from one model to the other. Thus, the Church-Turing thesis itself,
and the Turing-completeness results that make up the body of evidence
supporting it, have nothing to say about the skill and effort needed to write
software in a given language for a given machine or the computational resources
needed to run the software such as time, space, and bandwidth.
The blindness of Turing-completeness proofs to computational resource
constraints highlights a key assumption of the Turing machine and lambda
calculus models of calculation: they are endowed with infinite computational
resources, unlike every real-world computer. Software developed for the real
world must contend with scarce resources. A solution to a computational
problem that conserves these resources (e.g., Karmarkar's algorithm) can exhibit
nonobvious differences over prior art solutions to the same problem,22 as well
as substantial differences in function, way, and result that might support a reverse
doctrine of equivalents defense.226 These legally cognizable differences between
abstract computational models and real-world computers present a further
challenge to Klemens's essentially rhetorical efforts to extend Turing's narrowly
defined, formal notions of equivalence into the realm of patent doctrine.
Klemens's third and fourth propositions appeal specifically to the
mathematical form of the functions that can be expressed in Church's lambda
calculus.227 As explained above, however, the proofs of equivalence between the
lambda calculus and other Turing-complete models of calculation stop well short
of constructing algorithms that are "identical" or "entirely equivalent."" 5
Klemens's fourth proposition also relies on a dubious interpretation of Gale and
Shapley's remarks. 229
Klemens's fifth and sixth propositions are gross misstatements of patent law.
The Patent Act confers rights to exclude, not rights to ownership of mathematics

to the computation.'.
2 See supra notes 130-48 and accompanying text.
Chin, supra note 18. In the context of field-programmable gate arrays, Klemens himself
proposes an approach to infringement that would allow an imitator to take a "broad algorithm" from
a patented array provided that its implementation details were different from those that "the
designers worked to optimize" with respect to the array's physical resource constraints. KLEMENS,

supra note 2, at 67.
See supra notes 205-06, 210 and accompanying text.
"2

See supra notes 196-201 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
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or anything else. 230 It also precludes Church, Turing or anyone else from
obtaining (and, aforiori, asserting in a "lawsuit in the making") any patent rights
that could cover a scientific hypothesis such as the Church-Turing
thesis 23 1-particularly one232so admittedly indefinite with respect to the notion of
"computable functions."
Finally, the original articles formulating the Church-Turing thesis are all open
to public examination,23 3 and one will search them in vain for a proof of
Kiemens's seventh proposition-Donald Knuth's quip notwithstanding.
IV. CONCLUSIONS

As surveys of the empirical patent law literature, Bessen and Meurer's and
Klemens's books both identify a host of symptoms--overwhelmed examiners,
high litigation costs, and structural distortions of software-related industries-that
strongly indicate an economic misalignment between the patent system and the
pursuit of software innovation. Their diagnoses of the problem, however, suffer
from factual errors and misinterpretations of computer science concepts.
Particularly problematic are their various treatments of abstraction and
equivalence in computer science, which do not map directly or intuitively to
notions of abstraction and equivalence in legal reasoning and patent doctrine. At
least as currently presented, their arguments that software is different, and that
this difference compels technology-specific changes in patent doctrine, appear to
be without empirical support.
The factual corrections provided in this Article serve as a timely reminder that
an empirical approach to patent law reform requires attention not only to
economic methods, but also to the scientific principles and stakeholder
perspectives that pervade patent law and practice. Scholars interested in
diagnosing the disconnect between the patent system and software innovation
should know what computer scientists have said on the subject.
For example, European computer scientists Martin Campbell-Kelly and
Patrick Valduriez recently conducted a detailed technical review of the fifty mostcited software patents issued since 1990. 23 They found little evidence that

2035 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1).
231 See Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v. Proma Produkt-Und Mktg. Gesellschaft.b.H., 945 F.2d 1546, 1552

(Fed. Cit. 1991) ("By § 101 there is excluded from the patent system such things as scientific thearies,
pure mathematics, and laws of nature." (emphasis added)).
232 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2001) (requiring a "full, dear, concise, and exact" description).
3 Turing, supra note 196.
Martin Campbell-Kelly & Patrick Valduriez, A Technical Critique of Fiftjy Software Patents, 9
MARQ. INTELL. PRoP. L. REv. 249,252 (2005) [hereinafter Campbell-Kelly & Valduriez, A Technical
Critique of Fity Software Patents]. They have also conducted a subsequent study in the area of anti-
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obvious or overbroad patents had been granted." 5 Their main cause for concern
was that forty-four of the patents "had medium or low disclosure that would
make reproducing the invention either time-consuming or problematic." 236 The
scientists' findings support a more modest approach to software patent reform,
which would aim to elaborate the enablement and written description
requirements in accordance with the standard practices of software engineers for
documenting and validating their inventions. 37
238
While these findings are of considerable interest to the scientific community,
Campbell-Kelly and Valduriez have taken the exceptional and commendable step
of publishing their results in law reviews rather than in scientific journals.
Interestingly, Bessen and Meurer's book discusses at some length an earlier
historical article on software patents by Campbell-Kelly,239 but does not mention
any of his empirical studies. Bessen and Meurer may be right to criticize
Campbell-Kelly's historical account of the software patent controversy as too
narrow, 2' but their equally narrow view of empirical patent law scholarship
forecloses an important opportunity to acknowledge the methods and
perspectives that computer scientists can contribute to the study of software
patenting. Given the significant problems Bessen, Meurer and Klemens have
identified, the cause of software patent reform would be better served by a deeper
engagement among recognized scholars in the fields of patent law, economics,
and computer science than has appeared to date.

spam software patents. Martin Campbell-Kelly & Patrick Valduriez, An EmpiricalStudy of the Patent
ProspectTheoy: An Evaluation ofAnti-Spam Patents, 11 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2006).
3 Campbell-Kelly & Valduriez, A Technical CritiqueofFifty Software Patents,supranote 234, at 281.
236

Id.

" See supra note 158 and accompanying text; see alsoJay P. Kesan, Carrotsand Sticks to Create a
Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763, 785-87 (2002) (arguing that the Patent Office
should require the use of standard modeling and representational languages in software patent
disclosures). But see Ajeet P. Pal, Note, The Low Written DescriptionBarforSoftware Inventions, 94 VA.
L. REV. 457, 490-93 (2008) (arguing that patent law should continue to maintain a low written
description requirement for software inventions).
" Cf Wolfgang Emmerich et al., The Impact of Research on the Development of Middkware Technology,
ACM TRANSACTIONS ON SOFTWARE ENGINEERING AND METHODOLOGY, vol. 17, no. 4, art. 19
(Aug. 2008) (reporting, interah'a,findings regarding the historical importance of patented inventions
in the field of middleware technology).
" Martin Campbell-Kelly, Not All Bad: An HistoricalPerspective on Software Patents, 11 MICH.
TELECOMM
z. & TECH. L. REv. 191 (2005).
m BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 6, at 188-91.
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APPENDIX. A SIMPLE TURING MACHINE

This example of a Turing machine is designed to double the initial number of
+ symbols on its tape. The Turing machine consists of an infinite strip of tape
partitioned into an infinite number of spaces and a head that can move in either
direction along the tape and can print a symbol taken from a finite alphabet into
the space where it resides, replacing whatever was in the space before. At any
given time, the machine is in one of a finite number of states. The head performs
work on the tape through a sequence of moves. During each move, the head may
(a) perform a read, write, or erase operation, (b) change to any state (or remain in
the current state), or (c) move one space either to the left or to the right. The
specific move to be taken by the head at any given time is determined by a next
move function that depends on (i) the current state of the machine and (ii) the
current contents of the space where the head is located.
The table in Figure 6 describes the next move function for this Turing
machine. It has five states and uses the alphabet (+,(blank)}.
Machine State

If head reads a (blank)

If head reads a +

State I

STOP

Write <blank>; change to state 2;
move left

State 2

Write +; change to state 3; move left

Remain in state 2; move left

State 3

Write +; change to state 4; move

Remain in state 3; move left

right
State 4

Change to state 5; move right

Remain in state 4; move right

State 5

STOP

Write <blank>; change to state 2;
move left

Figure 6. Next move function for a Turing machine that doubles the initial
number of + symbols on the tape.
As indicated in Figure 7, the initial content of the tape, or input, consists of a
single contiguous string of + symbols on an otherwise blank tape. Initially (at
time t=0), the head is initially in state I and is located at the leftmost + symbol.
Given this initial condition and the next move function defined in Figure 6, it is
possible to determine the sequence of all subsequent moves. Figure 7 shows how
this Turing machine continues for fourteen steps and then stops in state 5.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2009

43

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 1

[Vol. 16:197

J. INTELL PROP. L
4

t-0

iL

JE

EDDAIEREDE
JE
IE.O

]E]ND
ID[

4

-DE00FEFEDRDDE
4
4
-JE
]DJCELDDE
JE
4

1-6

t-6
]-0[

JE
]END
]00[
I-7

4

-JE

t-10

JOE][
3[

4

JE
t-9t

JE m00[

JE

4

T[

JE

t- 12

mFE]

-

JE

-JE

4

t-13

rn0[
rF

I rnF
.-- I---I I----.Ik.

Figure 7. First fourteen steps of a computation on a Turing machine with the next
move function defined in Figure 6.
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